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Crying Over Spilt Milk: A Closer Look at Required Disclosures and
the Organic Milk Industry
InternationalDairyFoods Association v. Boggs'
I. INTRODUCTION

The term "organic" in "organic food" refers to the way the food
items are grown and processed. In order for food to be considered
organic, certain requirements must be met including: abstention from the
use of synthetic pesticides, bioengineered genes, hormones, and certain
fertilizers, and separation from conventionally manufactured food.2 The
organic food industry is rapidly growing, and has increased its sales
production from $1 billion in 1990 to $26.7 billion in 2010, including a
7.7% increase from 2009 to 2010.3 The benefits of organic food include
the absence of potentially harmful pesticide residue, engineered
antibiotics, and hormones from food, increased freshness of food, and less
of a harmful effect on the environment. 4 Despite these benefits and
popular support, the systematic failure of the law coupled with the
political and financial clout of the conventional food industry has arguably
had an unduly oppressive effect on the industry. A recent case,
InternationalDairy Foods Association v. Boggs,5 though illustrative, is
merely one example of the recurring unfavorable treatment of the organic
food industry.

' 622 F.3d 628 (6th Cir. 2010).
2 Maya W. Paul et al., OrganicFoods: UnderstandingOrganicFood
Labels, Benefits,
and Claims, HELP GUIDE (August 2011), http://www.helpguide.org/life/organic-foods
jpesticidesgmo.htm
(last visited Apr. 3, 2011).
3
Industry Statistics and ProjectedGrowth, News Room: Market Trends, ORGANIC
TRADE ASS'N, (June 2011), http://www.ota.com/organic/mt/business.html.
4 Paul,supra note 2, at The Benefit of Organic Food.
s 622 F.3d 628 (6th Cir. 2010).
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II. FACTS AND HOLDING
In InternationalDairy Foods, the Ohio Department of Agriculture
("ODA") had recently issued regulations concerning the labeling of milk
and milk products. 6 Two dairy-processor trade associations, the
International Dairy Foods Association ("IDFA") and the Organic Trade
Association ("OTA"),7 filed suit against the state of Ohio, claiming
violation of free speech and the Dormant Commerce Clause.8 They
argued the regulations constituted a prophylactic ban on their commercial
speech and served to construct barriers to interstate trade.9
The label issue revolved around the use of a genetically engineered
hormone known as recombinant bovine somatotropin ("rbST"), or
recombinant bovine growth hormone.'o The hormone is given to milkproducing cows, where it combines with naturally occurring bovine
somatotropin ("bST") to increase milk production by approximately
10%.11 Since the introduction of rbST to the milk industry, the demand
for milk without the hormone has increased. 12 Many dairy processors,
including several members of IDFA and OTA, do not accept milk that is
produced with rbST, and have labeled their products to indicate their milk
does not contain or was not produced with rbST.13 However, amidst the
growing demand for hormone-free milk, government organizations have
shown concern that labels on milk and milk products stating "rbST free"
or similar variations constitute false and misleading advertising.14
Before the ODA promulgated the regulations, the U.S. Food and
Drug Administration ("FDA") made several rulings concerning rbST." In
1993, the FDA approved the use of rbST and "found that there was no

6

id. at 633-34.

7Hereinafter

collectively referred to as "Plaintiffs."
Int '1DairyFoods, 622 F.3d at 634.
9
1d. at 635, 644.
oId. at 632.
"Id.
12 Id. at 633.
8

3 id.

14

Int'l Dairy Foods Ass'n v. Boggs, 622 F.3d 628, 633 (6th Cir. 2010).

'5 Id.
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significant difference between milk from treated and untreated cows."' 6
In the same ruling, the FDA determined that companies could label their
products as not containing the hormone, provided the label was not false
or misleading.17
One year later, the FDA addressed state calls for clarification of
the labeling issue by publishing an Interim Guidance.' 8 The Interim
Guidance discouraged claims on labels denoting the absence of rbST for
fear the "claims have the potential to be misunderstood by consumers,
because they might imply that milk from untreated cows is safer or of
higher quality than from treated cows." 19 The FDA indicated the potential
false and misleading nature of these claims could be ameliorated by
pairing the claims with the statement "no significant difference has been
shown between rbST-treated cows and non-rbST-treated cows" or "by
conveying the firm's reasons for choosing not to use milk from cows
treated with rbST." 20 The FDA also suggested that states require food
companies to create, and make available for inspection, documentation
substantiating their claims. 2 1
In response to dairy processors' advertisements reflecting the
nonuse of the hormone in their products sold in Ohio, Ohio Governor Ted
Strickland directed the ODA to "define what constitutes false and
misleading labels on milk and milk products." 2 2 He also directed the
agency to require milk companies to submit documentation supporting
such claims and to create labels paired with the statements recommended
by the FDA.2 3 The ODA adopted a final rule stating:

7

Id. at 632 (citing 59 F.R. 6279, 6279-80 (Feb. 10, 1994)).

1d. at 632-33 (citing 59 F.R. at 6280).
1Id. at 633. An Interim Guidance is a nonbinding document intended to help states draft
their own laws. Id.
'9 Id. (citing 59 F.R. at 6280).
20 Int'l Dairy Foods v. Boggs, 622 F.3d 628, 633 (6th Cir. 2010) (citing 59
F.R. at 6280).
2 2 Id. (citing 59 F.R. at 6280).
23

d

Id. at 633.
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(A) Pursuant to sections 917.05 and 3715.60 of the Revised Code,
dairy products will be deemed to be misbranded if they contain a
statement which is false or misleading.
(B) A dairy label which contains a production claim that "this milk
is from cows not supplemented with rbST" (or a substantially
equivalent claim) may be considered misleading on the basis of
such language, unless:
(1) The labeling entity has verified that the claim is
accurate, and proper documents, including, but not limited
to, producer signed affidavits, farm weight tickets and plant
audit trails, to support the claim, are made readily available
to ODA for inspection; and
(2) The label contains, in the same label panel, in exactly
the same font, style, case, and color and at least half the
size (but no smaller than seven point font) as the foregoing
representation, the following contiguous additional
statement (or a substantially equivalent statement): "The
FDA has determined that no significant difference has been
shown between milk derived from rbST-supplemented and
non-rbST-supplemented cows."
(C) Making claims regarding the composition of milk with respect
to hormones, such as "No Hormones", "Hormone Free", "rbST
Free", "rbGH Free", "No Artificial Hormones" and "bST Free", is
false and misleading. ODA will not permit such statements on any
dairy product labels.
(D) Statements may be considered to be false or misleading if they
indicate the absence of a compound not permitted by the United
States [F]ood and [D]rug [A]dministration to be present in any
dairy product, including, but not limited to antibiotics or pesticides.
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Except as otherwise provided in this rule, accurate production
claims will not be deemed false or misleading.24
Shortly after the final rule was issued, Plaintiffs filed suits2 1 in the
Southern District of Ohio challenging the rule as unconstitutional. 26
Plaintiffs also sought a preliminary injunction and upon denial filed an
interlocutory appeal with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. 27
The Sixth Circuit ruled in favor of the plaintiffs in part, finding there was
no rational basis for the requirement that the statement be contiguous.28
However, the court held in favor of Ohio, stating that when the U.S.
Congressional record demonstrates a pattern of misleading advertisements,
the requirement for disclosure has a sufficient rational basis. 29 The court
also found that because the disclosure requirement's burden on interstate
commerce did not clearly outweigh the local benefits, the requirement did
not violate the Dormant Commerce Clause. 30
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND

A. CommercialSpeech
The right to free speech, guaranteed by the First Amendment of the
U.S. Constitution, is generally considered to be one of the most important
and indispensible fundamental rights. 3 1 The right to free speech has
traditionally been justified as a means to advance the values of truth in the
marketplace of ideas, the facilitation of self-governance, and the
promotion of individual autonomy. 32 However, commercial speech has
long been regarded as an exception to the general rule. In Valentine v.
24

Id. at 634 (citing Ohio Admin. Code § 901:11-8-01
(2011)).
Id. Plaintiffs filed separate suits at the district level, and both suits were consolidated.
26 Int'l Dairy Foods v. Boggs, 622 F.3d
628, 634 (6th Cir. 2010).
" Id at 634-35.
28 Id. at 643. The "contiguous" requirement refers
to Ohio Admin. Code § 901:11-801(B)(2) (2011).
29
30 Id. at 642.
Id. at 649-50.
3 N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269-70 (1964);
U.S. Const. amend. I.
32 Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 269, Abrams v. U.S., 250 U.S. 616, 629 (1919).
25
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Chrestensen, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that "the Constitution imposes
no such restraint on government as respects purely commercial
advertising" and that "the extent to which commercial speech was
protected was wholly a matter for 'legislative judgment."' 33 Prior to the
1970s, the issue of commercial speech appeared before the Court on
numerous occasions and the Court artfully dodged it by ruling on
alternative grounds. 34
However, in 1976, the case of Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v.
Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., forced the Supreme Court to
revisit the issue and determine "whether speech which does no more than
propose a commercial transaction is so removed from any exposition of
ideas and from truth, science, morality, and arts in general, in its diffusion
of liberal sentiments on the administration of Government, that it lacks all
protection." 35
The Court first reasoned that commercial speech may be of general
public interest because it allows the populace to know what goods and
The Court used examples such as
services are available. 36
"advertisements stating that referral services for legal abortions are
available" and that "a manufacturer of artificial furs promotes his product
as an alternative to the extinction by his competitors of fur-bearing
mammals."3 The Court then found that "the allocation of our resources in
large measure will be made through numerous private economic
decisions" and that there was a strong interest in these economic decisions
"in the aggregate, [to] be intelligent and well informed." 38 The Court also

3

Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 54 (1942).

34 See Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425

U.S. 748,

758-61 (1976) (noting the Supreme Court had "avoided" the issue of commercial speech
in Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Human Relations Comm'n, 413 U.S. 376 (1973) and the
Valentine holding "arguably might have persisted" in Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809
(1975)).
s Id. at 762 (quoting Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations,
413 U.S. 376, 385 (1973); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942);
Roth v. U.S., 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957)).
36 Va. State Bd. ofPharmacy, 435 U.S. at 765.
37
Id. at 764 (referring to Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975); Fur Info. & Fashion
Council, Inc. v. E. F. Timme & Son, 364 F.Supp. 16 (S.D.N.Y. 1973)).
38 Va. State Bd. ofPharmacy, 435 U.S. at 765.
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tied in the value of commercial speech to the traditional justifications for
the right to free speech by stating "it is also indispensable to the formation
of intelligent opinions as to how that system ought to be regulated or
altered," which is essential to the goal of "enlighten[ing] public decisionmaking in a democracy." 39
While the Supreme Court extended constitutional protection to
commercial speech in Virginia State Bd ofPharmacy, the Court failed to
establish how much protection commercial speech would receive.
Subsequently, the Court dealt with precisely this issue in CentralHudson
Gas v. Public Service Comm., by laying out the current framework of
analysis for commercial speech. 4 0 First, for commercial speech to retain
any First Amendment protection, the speech "must concern lawful activity
and not be misleading."4A If a court establishes the speech is entitled to
First Amendment protection, the CentralHudson analysis next requires a
determination of "whether the asserted government interest is
substantial."4 2 Finally, if a court finds that the government interest is
substantial, the court must then decide "whether the regulation directly
advances the governmental interest asserted and whether it is not more
extensive than is necessary to serve that interest." 4 3 In effect, the Court
extended a greater level of scrutiny to government regulation of
commercial speech."
A common way to combat the threat of misleading speech is
through government requirement of disclosures; this provides a middle
ground between no regulation and outright prohibition and thereby enables
a state to regulate in a way that "is not more extensive than is necessary to
serve that interest." The first major case decided by the Supreme Court in
this area was Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of the Supreme
Court of Ohio.45 In Zauderer, an attorney facing the threat of professional
sanctions challenged a disciplinary rule requiring disclosure of the method
39

d.
See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557
(1980).
41
Id. at 566.
40

42 Id.

43

d.

Id. at 574.
45471 U.S. 626 (1985).
4
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used to calculate attorney fees. 46 Specifically, the attorney advertised that
clients would not be responsible for fees if their case was unsuccessful,
but elected not to disclose a continuing liability for the costs of litigation.4 7
The Court first emphasized the distinction between "disclosure
requirements and outright prohibitions on speech," stating that "Ohio has
not attempted to prevent attorneys from conveying information to the
public; it has only required them to provide somewhat more information
than they might otherwise be inclined to present."4 8
The Court further distinguished "factual information in
advertising" from instances where the state has tried to "prescribe what
shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of
opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein."49
With the latter scenario, the Court made a strong statement that
"involuntary affirmation could be commanded only on even more
immediate and urgent grounds than silence." 5 0 However, the Court
restated that the protection of commercial speech was justified by the free
flow of information and the attorney's right not to speak in this context
was "minimal."" The Court concluded that because of the government's
strong interest in "dissipat[ing] the possibility of consumer confusion or
deception", that "an advertiser's rights are adequately protected as long as
disclosure requirements are reasonably related to the State's interest in
preventing deception of consumers." 52 Notably, the Court also
"recognize[d] that unjustified or unduly burdensome disclosure
requirements might offend the First Amendment by chilling protected
commercial speech."53

Id at 636.

46
47

1Id at 633.

48

Id. at 650.
Id. at 651 (quoting W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943)).
so Zauderer,471 U.S. at 651 (quoting W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S.
624, 642 (1943)).
i Id. at 651.
49

52

Id. (quoting In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 201 (1982)).

53id

531

CRYING OVER SPILT MILK

In Zauderer, the Court elaborated on the government's burden of
proof regarding the constitutionality of disclosure requirements.5 4 The
Court stated, "[w]hen the possibility of deception is as self-evident as it is
in this case, we need not require the State to 'conduct a survey of
the .. . public before it [may] determine that the [advertisement] had a
tendency to mislead."'"
A recent Supreme Court case, Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v.
U.S.,56 "established that Zauderer applies where a disclosure requirement
targets speech that is inherently misleading," clarifying that the Zauderer
analysis applies to commercial speech where the "possibility of deception"
was "self-evident."57 In Milavetz, the Supreme Court applied Zaudererto
provisions of the Bankruptcy Code required disclosures for debt relief
agency advertisements. The Supreme Court upheld the provisions upon
finding that the requirements were "reasonably related to the
[Government's] interest in preventing deception of consumers." 59 Before
arriving at this conclusion, the Court dismissed the counterargument that
there was no actual evidence showing that a debt relief agency's
advertisements would otherwise be misleading, based on the premise that
"[e]vidence in the congressional record ... is adequate to establish that the
likelihood of deception in. . . 'is hardly a speculative one."' 60
B. Evolution of the Regulation at Issue
The development of the regulation at issue in InternationalDairy
Foods stems from the FDA and its rulings on rbST. 6 1 The original Food

54
5

Id. at 652-53.
Zauderer,471 U.S. at 652-53. (quoting FTC v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 380 U.S. 374,

391-92 (1965)).
130 S. Ct. 1324 (2010).
Dairy Foods, 622 F.3d at 622 (referring to Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v.
U.S., 130 S. Ct. 1324 (2010)).
58 Milavetz, at 130 S. Ct. at 1339.
59
Id. at 1341.
6
1Id. at 1340.
61 Int'l Dairy Foods, 622 F.3d at 632-33 (referring to Interim
Guidance on the Voluntary
Labeling of Milk and Milk Products from Cows that Have Not Been Treated with
56

5Int'l
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and Drug Act was signed into law by Theodore Roosevelt in 1906 with the
purpose of ensuring that interstate commerce was free from adulterated or
misbranded food, drinks and drugs. 62 However, it was administered by the
Bureau of Chemistry until 1927, when the powers of the original Food and
Drug Act were vested in a new entity then known as the Food, Drug, and
Insecticide Administration. 63 Subsequently, the passage of the Federal
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act in 1938 vastly increased the powers of the
FDA.6 4 Under the Act's broad grant of jurisdiction, animal drugs began to
be regulated and these regulations were consolidated under one section
under the 1968 Animal Drug Amendments.65 It was under this section
that the FDA approved Monsanto's application for rbST in 1993,66
concluding, "the action will not have a significant impact on the human
environment and that an environmental impact statement is not

required." 67
Labeling of milk and milk products quickly became an issue of
concern, and the states, along with industry and consumer representatives,
looked to the FDA for further guidance. 68 In 1994, the FDA issued an
Interim Guidance, deciding the hormone "is safe and effective for dairy
cows, that milk from rbST-treated cows is safe for human consumption,
and that production and use of the product do not have a significant impact

Recombinant Bovine Somatotropin, 59 Fed.Reg. 6279, 6279-80 (Feb. 10, 1994); 58
Fed.Reg.
59946 (Nov. 12, 1993) (approving the use of rbST)).
62
SignificantDates in U.S. Foodand DrugLaw History, Food and Drug Admin., http://
www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/WhatWeDo/History/Milestones/ucm 128305.htm (last visited
March 2, 2011).
63
Id. Three years later, the entity changed its name to its current form. Id.
SId.

65 Id. (referring

to the current version of 21 U.S.C. § 360b (2006)).
Monsanto is a Fortune 500 company, headquartered in St. Louis, Missouri, whose main
products include agricultural and vegetable seeds, plant biotechnology traits and crop
protection chemicals. Monsanto at a Glance, Monsanto Co., http://www.monsanto.com/
whoweare/Pages/default.aspx (last visited Oct. 30, 2011).
67 58 Fed. Reg. 59946-02, 59947 (Nov. 12, 1993); see supratext accompanying notes

14-16.

68

Interim Guidance on the Voluntary Labeling of Milk and Milk Products from Cows
that Have Not Been Treated with Recombinant Bovine Somatotropin, 59 Fed.Reg. 627904, 6280 (Feb. 10, 1994).
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on the environment." 69 The FDA further "found that there was no
significant difference between milk from treated and untreated cows." 7 0
The FDA recognized there might be some producers who wished to label
their products to reflect the non-use of rbST and stated, "food companies
that do not use milk from cows supplemented with rbST may voluntarily
inform consumers of this fact in their product labels or labeling, provided
that any statements made are truthful and not misleading."n
The FDA also provided some suggested structure for the regulation
of milk and milk product labels. 72 The FDA admonished composition
claims as a whole, stating the agency was "concerned that the term 'rbST
free' may imply a compositional difference between milk from treated and
untreated cows rather than a difference in the way the milk is produced."73
The FDA also noted that even production claims have "the potential to be
misunderstood by consumers."74 The FDA advised that such claims
would need to be placed in their "proper context" to eliminate their
misleading nature and recommended the claims be paired with a
disclaimer such as "[n]o significant difference has been shown between
milk derived from rbST-treated and non-rbST-treated cows." 75
Additionally, to address the issue that there was "currently no way to
differentiate analytically between naturally occurring bST and
recombinant bST in milk, nor are there any measurable compositional
differences between milk from cows that receive supplemental bST and
milk from cows that do not," the FDA suggested state certification
processes to verify claims concerning the lack of use of rbST.76

6

1Id. at 6279-80.
Id. at 6280.
71 Id.
72
7o

d.

73 id.
74 Interim

Guidance on the Voluntary Labeling of Milk and Milk Products
from Cows
that Have Not Been Treated with Recombinant Bovine Somatotropin, 59 Fed.Reg. 627904, 6280 (Feb. 10, 1994).
7Id.

76id.
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Pursuant to the Interim Guidance, several states issued regulations
closely following the FDA's advice. 7 Prior to the promulgation of the
Ohio regulation, the Governor of Ohio ordered that the regulation follow
the FDA's Interim Guidance.
After two hearings and despite only
seventy of the 2,700 comments being in favor of the new regulation, the
regulation was adopted in May 2008.
IV. THE INSTANT DECISION
Plaintiffs appealed the district court's adverse rulings on the
following issues: (1) whether the ban on composition claims violated the
First Amendment; (2) whether the disclosure requirement for production
claims violated the First Amendment; and (3) whether the regulation
violated the Dormant Commerce Clause. 80
A. Does the Ban on Composition Claims Violate the FirstAmendment?
The court first considered whether the regulation's ban on the use
of phrases concerning composition of the milk such as "rbST-free"
violated the First Amendment. 8' The court noted that the regulated speech
was commercial speech, and thus required consideration of the Central
Hudson test.82 The court explained how the CentralHudson test is a twopart analysis, in which the court first determines whether the regulation
affects commercial speech that concerns lawful activity or is not
misleading. 83 If the speech concerns lawful activity and is not misleading,
then the expression is generally protected by the First Amendment, and the
court will further consider "1) whether the asserted government interest is
substantial, 2) whether the regulation directly advances that interest and 3)

See MINN. STAT. § 32.75 (1994), VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 6, § 2762 (2003), Wis. STAT. §
97.25, W. VA. CODE R. § 61-4D-4 (1995), ALASKA STAT. § 17.20.013 (1999).
78 Int'l Dairy Foods Ass'n v. Boggs, 622 F.3d 628, 633 (6th Cir. 2010).
7
1 d. at 634.
oId. at 635.
8 Id.
8
1Id. at 635-36.
83 Int'l Dairy Foods Ass'n v. Boggs, 622 F.3d 628, 636 (6th
Cir. 2010).
7
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whether the regulation is more extensive than necessary to serve that
interest."84
Accordingly, the court inquired into whether the regulated speech
was false or misleading, stating that where commercial speech is
"inherently likely to deceive or where the record indicates that a particular
form or method of advertising has in fact been deceptive," the state may
prohibit the speech in its entirety.8 5 The district court ruled in favor of
Ohio, concluding that the regulated speech "impl[ied] a compositional
difference between those products that are produced with rb[ST] and those
that are not" in direct conflict with the FDA's findings. Considering the
appropriateness of the district court's conclusion, the appellate court
reviewed several studies in the record, and found that even the FDA's
findings left substantial room for uncertainty concerning the compositional
differences. 8 7 Upon a thorough analysis of the available evidence, the
court concluded that the speech was not false or misleading.8
The court next turned to the second part of the CentralHudson
test, first considering "whether the asserted government interest is
substantial."8 9 The court stated that the regulation's purpose was "to
prevent the use of 'false or misleading' labeling." 90 While there was no
dispute that the interest was substantial, the court recognized that when the
purpose of a regulation is to prevent the use of false or misleading
advertising, the state is required to "demonstrate that the harms it recites
are real and that its restriction will in fact alleviate them to a material
degree." 9 ' The court was unimpressed with Ohio's evidence consisting of
the FDA's inconclusive opinion and an underwhelming minority of
84 Id. (citing Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm., 447 U.S. 557
(1980)).
85
Id. (quoting In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 202-03 (1982)).
86
id.
87Id. (referring to Interim Guidance
on the Voluntary Labeling of Milk and Milk
Products from Cows that Have Not Been Treated with Recombinant Bovine
Somatotropin, 59 F.R. 6279, 6280).
88 Int'l Dairy Foods Ass'n. v. Boggs,
622 F.3d 628, 637 (6th Cir. 2010).
Id. at 638.
9 Id.
Id. (quoting Ibanez v. Fla. Dep't of Bus. & Prof'1 Regulation, Bd. of Accountancy, 512
U.S. 136, 146 (1994)).
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comments during the notice and comment period of the regulation-making
process. 92
Furthermore, the court found inquiry concerning the substantial
government interest irrelevant after careful consideration of the Central
Hudson element "whether the regulation is more extensive than necessary
to serve that interest." 93 The court agreed with the plaintiffs that the
state's interest in preventing false and misleading advertising could
similarly be alleviated by use of a disclaimer. This dismissed Ohio's
argument that a disclaimer would further confuse consumers. 94
Accordingly, the court reversed the summary judgment of the district
court and invalidated the provision of the regulation barring the use of
composition claims.95
B. Does the Disclosure Requirementfor ProductionClaims Violate the
FirstAmendment?
The second issue that the court considered was whether Ohio's
regulation of production claims such as "this milk is from cows not
supplemented with rbST" violated the First Amendment. 96 The regulation
required that labels with production claims contain
in the same label panel, in exactly the same font, style, case, and
color and at least half the size (but no smaller than seven point
font) as the foregoing representation, the following contiguous
additional statement (or a substantially equivalent statement): 'The
FDA has determined that no significant difference has been shown

92

Id. at 638-39. A notice and comment period is required for federal regulations
under

the Administrative Procedure Act, where the regulation will publish a rule prior to its
enactment and allow for interested parties to influence the regulation-creating process.
See 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559 (2006).
9 Int'l Dairy Foods Ass'n. v. Boggs, 622 F.3d 628, 639 (6th
Cir. 2010).
94
id.
9
Id. at 650.
96
1d. at 640.
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between milk derived from rbST-supplemented and non-rbSTsupplemented cows.' 97
The district court granted partial summary judgment for Ohio by
determining that the disclosure requirement was subject to a
reasonableness standard, but denied summary judgment on the issue of
whether the formatting requirements were unduly burdensome, based
upon the finding of a genuine issue of material fact.9 8
Plaintiffs first contended the district court had applied an incorrect
standard, arguing the CentralHudson test called for intermediate scrutiny,
and this standard should have been used to analyze their claim. 99 The
district court had relied on Zauderer, a U.S. Supreme Court case finding
disclosure requirements to be less of an infringement on the right to free
speech than an outright prohibition, and that the "constitutionally
protected interest in not providing any particular factual information ... is
'minimal."' 00 The Supreme Court then set forth a test where disclosure
requirements need only be "reasonably related to the State's interest in
preventing deception of consumers."' 0 '
The appellate court then looked into the further development of the
Zauderer standard in a recent case, Milavetz, which provided that the
relaxed scrutiny of Zauderer only applies when the commercial speech is
inherently misleading.1 02 Relying on the opinions of sister circuits, the
InternationalDairy Foods court extended the Zauderer doctrine to apply
to potentially misleading commercial speech, reasoning that the
justification for applying the Zauderer standard to inherently misleading
speech was substantially similar to applying the standard to potentially

97

Id. (citing Ohio admin. Code 901:11-8-01 (B)(2) (2011)).
9 Int'l Dairy Foods Ass'n. v. Boggs, 622 F.3d 628, 640 (6th Cir. 2010).

9 Id.
00

d. at
of Ohio,
101Id. at
1o2Id.
at
(2010)).

641 (quoting Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of the Supreme Court
471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985)).
642 (quoting Zauderer,471 U.S. at 651).
641 (citing Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. U.S, 130 S.Ct. 1324, 1339
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misleading speech. 0 3 While the plaintiffs' position for an intermediate
scrutiny standard had some support, the appellate court affirmed the
district court's ruling and application of Zauderer.104 The court based this
decision upon a finding that the production claims were potentially
misleading because while the claims were true, they "implie[d] that those
processors that do use rbST have an inferior or unsafe product or that it is
compositionally different."105
The court next turned to the district court's analysis under
Zauderer.106 The district court concluded, "Ohio's Rule ... strikes the
right balance between preventing misleading information and providing
10 7
enough information for consumers to make an informed choice."
Although the plaintiffs argued that Ohio failed to show how the
production claims were misleading, the court found this unpersuasive,
citing Milavetz, where it was determined that "[e]vidence in the
congressional record demonstrating a pattern of [misleading]
advertisements . .. is adequate to establish that the likelihood of deception

in this case is hardly a speculative one." 08 The court stated that while the
state's evidence was weak, it at least indicated the risk of misleading
consumers was not speculative.109 Accordingly, the appellate court found
the district court was correct in deciding the disclosure requirement for
production claims was reasonably related to ameliorating that risk." 0
The appellate court also considered the specific formatting
mandated by the regulation and determined that the "font, style, case, and
color requirements for the disclosure's text have a self-evident rational
basis," in that they "prevent label designers from hiding the disclosure by
Int'l Dairy Foods Ass'n. v. Boggs, 622 F.3d 628, 641 (6th Cir. 2010) (relying
on Nat'l
Elec. Mfrs. Ass'n v. Sorrell, 272 F.3d 104, 113 (2d Cir. 2001); U.S. v. Wenger, 427 F.3d
840, 849 (10th Cir. 2005)).
'0Id. at 641-42.
103

'os

Id. at 642.

1o6 id.

107 Id. (quoting

Int'l Dairy Foods Ass'n. v. Boggs, 2009 WL 937045, 10 (S.D. Ohio

2009)).
1os Int'l Dairy Foods Ass'n. v. Boggs, 622 F.3d 628, 642 (6th Cir. 2010) (quoting
Milavetz, 130 S.Ct. at 1340).
109 Id.

110 Id.
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manipulating the text.""' However, upon a separate analysis of the
requirement that the disclosure be contiguous to the production claim, the
court found this requirement had no rational basis after discovering
nothing in the record to support the contention that the use of an asterisk
would be misleading to consumers."12
C. Does the Regulation Violate the Dormant Commerce Clause?
The third issue considered by the appellate court was Plaintiffs'
contention that the regulation violated the Dormant Commerce Clause." 3
The court summarized the function of the Commerce Clause, stating that it
operated simultaneously as both as a grant of power to Congress to
regulate interstate commerce and " . . . as a self-executing limitation on the
power of the States to enact laws imposing substantial burdens on such
commerce."ll4 This interpretation of the Commerce Clause as imposing a
self-executing limitation on the power of the States is commonly referred
to as the Dormant Commerce Clause." 5
Plaintiffs first contended the district court had erred by using an
incorrect analysis on their Dormant Commerce Clause claim.' 16 The
appellate court enumerated a basic classification of ways to violate the
Dormant Commerce Clause: "(1) the [regulation] clearly discriminates
against interstate commerce in favor of in-state commerce; (2) it imposes a
burden on interstate commerce that outweighs any benefits received; or (3)
it has the practical effect of extraterritorial control of interstate
commerce." 7 The district court first determined whether the regulation
clearly discriminated against interstate commerce, and then decided the
regulation did not impose a burden on interstate commerce that

"' Id. at 643.
112

113
4

Id.

Int'l Dairy Foods Ass'n. v. Boggs, 622 F.3d 628, 644 (6th Cir.
2010).
Id. (quoting S.-Cent.Timber Dev., Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82, 87 (1984)).

1s See id.
"16 Id.

Id. at 645 (quoting Grand River Enters. Six Nations, Ltd. v. Beebe, 574 F.3d 929, 942
(8th Cir. 2009) (citations omitted)).
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outweighed any benefit received." 8 The appellate court agreed with
Plaintiffs' argument that the district court had failed to consider whether
the regulation had a practical effect of extraterritorial control of interstate
commerce; therefore the district court had applied an incorrect analysis on
the Dormant Commerce Clause claim.119
The court then analyzed whether the regulation governed
extraterritorially. 120 According to the court, a regulation governs
extraterritorially when it "controls commerce occurring wholly outside the
boundaries of a State, which exceeds the inherent limits of the enacting
State's authority" and will be considered per se invalid.121 The court
distinguished the regulation at issue from those previously struck down on
similar grounds because "how the Processors label their products in Ohio
has no bearing on how they are required to label their products in other
states ... [n]or does compliance with the Ohio Rule raise the possibility
that the [plaintiffs] would be in violation of the regulations of another
state."1 22 The court also distinguished Plaintiffs' reliance on Southern
Pacific Co.123 by stating that "the Ohio Rule in the present case does not
impede or control the flow of milk products across the country" and that
the FDA had explicitly permitted the states to regulate independently in

Int'l Dairy Foods Ass'n. v. Boggs, 622 F.3d 628, 642 (6th Cir. 2010).
"9 Id. at 645-46.
120
Id. at 646.
121Id. (quoting Healy v. Beer Inst., 491 U.S. 324, 336 (1989) (citation
omitted)).
122 Id. at 647 (distinguishing Healy and Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. N.Y. State
Liquor Auth., 476 U.S. 573 (1986)).
123 Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761 (1945). "The Supreme Court in that
case struck down an Arizona statute that restricted the maximum number of railroad cars
comprising a train in that state to 14 for passenger trains and 70 for freight trains.
Because most trains in the country exceeded those number of cars, train operators were
forced to break up their trains prior to entering Arizona and reassemble them upon
leaving the state. Observing that the Arizona statute essentially governed the flow of
train traffic from Los Angeles, California to El Paso, Texas, the Court held that '[t]he
practical effect of such regulation is to control train operations beyond the boundaries of
the state exacting it.' National uniformity in the regulation of railroads, the Court pointed
out, was 'practically indispensable to the operation of an efficient and economical
national railway system."' Int'l Dairy Foods at 647 (citations omitted).
118
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this area. 124 The court concluded the regulation did not govern
extraterritorially. 125
The court next examined whether the regulation was
"protectionist.' 126 The court stated that a "[state regulation] can
discriminate against out-of-state interests in three different ways: (a)
facially, (b) purposefully, or (c) in practical effect." 127 The court
succinctly decided the language of the regulation failed to indicate that the
regulation either facially or purposefully discriminated against out-of-state
interests.128 The court was further unimpressed with Plaintiffs' argument
that the regulation discriminated in practical effect, recognizing that it was
"more akin to stating that the law discriminates against dairy producers
that do not use rbST as opposed to dairy producers that do use rbST."l 29
The court continued stating that "[b]oth Ohio and out-of-state processors
are in effect either benefitted or burdened equally" and concluded that the
regulation was not protectionist. 3 0
Finally, the court considered whether the regulation imposed a
burden on interstate commerce that was greater than any benefits
received.
The court found that the burdens alleged by Plaintiffs were
relieved by the court's First Amendment invalidation of portions of the
regulation.132 The court then noted that "states have always possessed a
legitimate interest in the protection of their people against fraud and
deception in the sale of food products."1 33 Accordingly, the court affirmed

Int'l Dairy Foods Ass'n. v. Boggs, 622 F.3d 628, 647-48
(6th Cir. 2010) (quoting
Southern
Pacific
at
775)
(quotations
omitted)).
1251 d. at 648.
124

126 id.

127Id. (quoting E. Ky. Res. v. Fiscal Court of Magoffin Cnty., 127 F.3d 532, 540 (6th Cir.

1997)). State law is considered protectionist if it "results in 'differential treatment of instate and out-of-state economic interests that benefits the former and burdens the latter."'
Id. (citing Tenn. Scrap Recyclers Ass'n v. Bredesen, 556 F.3d 442, 449 (6th Cir. 2009)).
18id.

29

Int'l Dairy Foods Ass'n. v. Boggs, 622 F.3d 628,
649 (6th Cir. 2010).

131Id.
132

d
13Id.
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the summary judgment in favor of Ohio finding that the regulation did not
violate the Dormant Commerce Clause.134
V. COMMENT
In InternationalDairy Foods, the court ruled in part against the
dairy representatives and in favor of the Ohio Department of
Agriculture. '" The holding of International Dairy Foods, when
combined with the existing case law, allows certain companies to have
their cake and eat it too. For example, Monsanto, the developer and thenexclusive owner of the rbST formula,' 3 6 was firmly enmeshed in the
regulation-making process and bore responsibility for the majority of the
comments supporting the regulation during the notice-and-comment
period.137 The direct consequence of the decision to uphold the Ohio
regulation allows those benefitting from the use of genetically engineered
hormones with unknown effects to reap profits by limiting the ability of
their competitors to advertise and inform consumers. To understand the
impact of this case, InternationalDairy Foods'3 8 must first be compared
with Amestoy,139 a Second Circuit case which struck down a Vermont
regulation requiring dairy processors to disclose whether their products
contained or were produced with rbST.140 Taken together, these cases
demonstrate the adversity that the organic food industry faces. Second, it

134 Int'l Dairy Foods Ass'n. v. Boggs, 622 F.3d 628, 650 (6th Cir. 2010).
13s Id. at 631.
'36 Dealbook, Eli Lilly to Buy Monsanto'sDairy Cow Hormonefor $300 Million, N.Y.
TIMEs, Aug. 20, 2008, availableat http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2008/08/20/
eli-lilly-to-buy-monsantos-dairy-cow-hormone-for-300-million/.
137 Appellants Int'l Dairy Foods Ass'n and Organic Trade Ass'n's Joint Opening Brief at
n.4, Int'l Dairy Foods Ass'n v. Boggs, 622 F.3d 628 (6th Cir. 2010) (Nos. 09-3526, 093515), 2009 WL 3269471.
38
Boggs upheld a regulation partially barring the disclosure that products do not contain
or were not produced with rbST, which is in sharp contrast to Amestoy's holding that
disclosure may not be required.
13 Int'l Dairy Foods Ass'n v. Amestoy, 92 F.3d 67, 70 (2d Cir. 1996).
140 Id. at 67, 69-70.
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is worth considering the implications of the Sixth Circuit's extension of
the Zauderer doctrine to apply to "potentially misleading" advertising.14 1
A. Bias Against OrganicFoodIndustry
The holding of InternationalDairy Foods in connection with that
of Amestoy sheds light on an arguably systemic bias against the organic
food industry.
First, constitutional law has formed a significant
impediment to the competitiveness of the organic food industry against the
engineered food industry. Second, in light of the current procedural
requirements for the promulgation of regulations, there is very little the
organic food industry and its supporters can do to bar impeding regulation.
1. Understanding Amestoy
In International Dairy Foods Association v. Amestoy, milk and
milk products trade organizations filed suit seeking to enjoin a Vermont
statute obligating certain labeling requirements for milk and milk
products.142 On April 13, 1994, the governor of Vermont approved a
statute requiring disclosure labels for milk and milk products offered for
retail sale in Vermont if the milk and milk products were composed of
milk from cows treated with rbST.143 In particular, the statute specified,
"[i]f rBST has been used in the production of milk or a milk product for
retail sale in this state, the retail milk or milk product shall be labeled as
such."l44 The regulation promulgated by the Vermont Department of
Agriculture required retailers of milk and milk products created from milk
from cows treated with rbST to mark the milk containers individually or
the shelves upon which the milk was stored for sale with blue markers. 145
Additionally, the regulation mandated the use of a sign explaining the
significance of the blue markers, requiring the explanatory signs to state:
"The United States Food and Drug Administration has determined that

Int'l Dairy Foods Ass'ns v. Boggs, 622 F.3d 628, 641 (6th Cir. 2010).
142 Amestoy, 92 F.3d at 69-70.
14 3 Id. at 69 (citing VT. STAT. ANN. TIT. 6, § 2754(c) (1994) (terminated 1998)).
141

4Id.
45

'

Id. at 69-70.
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there is no significant difference between milk from treated and untreated
cows. It is the law of Vermont that products made from the milk of rBSTtreated cows be labeled to help consumers make informed shopping

decisions."l 46
The statute was challenged by various trade organizations and
upon denial of a preliminary injunction by the U.S. District Court of
Vermont, the trade organizations filed an appeal with the Second
Circuit. 147 In order to determine whether a court should grant a
preliminary injunction, the court must also evaluate the likelihood of
success on the merits.148 In doing so, the Second Circuit applied the
CentralHudson doctrine to ascertain the likelihood of the statute and the
subsequent regulation withstanding the degree of scrutiny warranted for
state regulation of free speech.14 9 The court found that the element
requiring a substantial state interest was dispositive, and Vermont argued
its interest in promoting a "strong consumer interest and the public's right
to know" could withstand such scrutiny.' 5 0 However, the court held that
"consumer curiosity alone is not a strong enough state interest to sustain
the compulsion of even an accurate, factual statement" and granted a
preliminary injunction enjoining enforcement of the statute.' 5 1
It is worth noting that the Vermont statute was analyzed using the
Central Hudson analysis, which mandates intermediate scrutiny for the
regulation of commercial speech, 152 whereas the Ohio statute in
International Dairy Foods was analyzed under the Zauderer analysis,
providing only a rational basis analysis for the regulations requiring
disclosures.153 In this respect, the Amestoy majority opinion's decision to
apply Central Hudson and not Zauderer is nothing short of puzzling,
especially since both the dissent and Vermont's appellate brief argued for
the application of Zauderer and pointed out Zauderer's applicability to

146
147

Int'l Dairy Foods Ass'n v. Amestoy, 92 F.3d 67, 70 (2d Cir. 1996).

148 id.

149 Id. at 73.
150Id

151
Id. at
52

74.
I Id. at 71.
153 Int'l Dairy Foods Ass'n. v. Boggs, 622 F.3d 628,
640-43 (6th Cir. 2010).
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disclosure requirements.1 54 Further, the dissent and the Vermont brief
both proffered other state interests including health and economic interests
that have previously been held to be legitimate state interests.' 5 5
The most apparent distinction between the facts of the two cases is
the lack of any pre-existing advertisement, a difference which, while
minor with respect to the consumer, looms large when placed in the
context of constitutional law. The Zauderer doctrine states that free
speech is adequately protected as long as disclosure requirements for
commercial speech are reasonably related to the state's interest in
preventing deception of consumers through false or misleading
advertising.156 Amestoy did not involve an advertising issue, misleading or
not, and thus Vermont could not use any rational basis to justify its
disclosure regulation; instead it was forced to justify the regulation under
the more exacting intermediate level of scrutiny. 5 7 It seems odd that the
undisclosed use of a hormone, tentatively deemed to be safe with
uncertain long-term effects, to bolster production of a retail food product
is not considered false or misleading advertising. .However, in
International Dairy Foods, the court held that a truthful statement
notifying consumers that no rbST was used in the production or was
included in the composition of milk and milk products was false and
misleading, and this true statement required a disclaimer which
substantially negated the value of this commercial speech to the organic
foods industry. 158 Accordingly, a company like Monsanto will be
constitutionally entitled to conceal genetically or chemically modified
changes in food products from consumers, while also preventing organic

Int'l Dairy Foods Ass'n v. Amestoy, 92 F.3d 67, 77-78
(2d Cir. 1996) (Leval, J.,
dissenting); Brief for Defendants-Appellees at 29, Int'l Dairy Foods Ass'n v. Amestoy,
92
155 F.3d 67 (2d Cir. 1996) (No. 95-7819), 1995 WL 17049818.
Amestoy, 92 F.3d at 78 (Leval, J., dissenting); Brief for Defendants-Appellees
at 812, Int'l Dairy Foods Ass'n v. Amestoy, 92 F.3d 67 (2d Cir. 1996) (No. 95-7819), 1995
WL 17049818.
15 6
Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of Supreme Court of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626,
651 (1985).
57
Amestoy, 92 F.3d at 72.
158 Int'l Dairy Foods Ass'n. v. Boggs, 622 F.3d
628, 643-44 (6th Cir. 2010).
154
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competitors from taking advantage of the market created by the en masse
introduction of the chemically or genetically engineered food products.' 59
2. Impact on Regulation
In order to impede their organic competitors, chemical and genetic
developers must have the cooperation of some law-making body.
However, this does not appear to be a substantial obstacle to a company
like Monsanto in light of its footprint in both the issuance of regulations
and the subsequent litigation.' 60 Admittedly, the same might be said of
trade organizations such as International Dairy Foods Association, another
repeat player in the notice-and-comment process and litigation.161
It may be the case that the current decision-making process is best,
as no party is denied a voice. However, this premise is negatively
impacted by the fact that regulatory decision-making processes are mainly
governed by procedural requirements and are subject only to a deferential
"arbitrary and capricious" test for substantive decisions.' 6 In other words,
regardless of the amount of support for or against a particular regulation,
the issuing agency is permitted to freely regulate as long it pays token
attention to the dissenting voices and there is at least some support in the
record for its decision. This was illustrated in InternationalDairyFoods,
where fewer than seventy of the 2,700 emails and letters sent during the

159 See USA: Cultivationof GMplants, 2009, GMO Compass, (July 2009), http://www
.gmo-compass.org/eng/agribiotechnology/gmoplanting/506.usa cultivation gm-plants
_2009.html ("In the case of maize, soybean and cotton, 88 per cent of seeds planted in the
USA in 2009 were genetically modified); USDA, Characteristics,Costs, andIssuesfor
OrganicDairy Farming,ECONOMIC RESEARCH REPORT NUMBER 82, 28 (2009),

availableat http://www.ers.usda.gov/Publications/ERR82/ERR82.pdf (stating that in
2005, 17% of conventional farms used rbST).
160 Appellants' Joint Opening Brief, Int'l Dairy Foods Ass'n v. Boggs, 622 F.3d 628 (6th
Cir. 2010) (Nos. 09-3526, 09-3515), 2009 WL 3269471; Brief of Monsanto Company as
Amicus Curiae in Support of Appellants, Int'l Dairy Foods Ass'n v. Amestoy, 92 F.3d 67
(2d. Cir. 1996) (No. 95-7819), 1995 WL 17049821.
161 See Amestoy, 92 F.3d at 70; see also Boggs, 622 F.3d at 628.
162 Alaska Dept. of Envt'l Conservation v. EPA, 540 U.S. 461, 496-97
(2004); Vt.
U.S.
519, 523-24
Res.
Def.
Council,
Inc.,
435
Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural
(1978).

547

CRYING OVER SPILT MILK

notice-and-comment period were in favor of the proposed regulation, yet
the regulation was still enacted.163 While one may understandably be
unable to fully appreciate suggested proposals for the complete overhaul
of the governmental regulatory system, the current state of affairs favors
engineered food companies, partially because of the idiosyncrasies of the
federal and state regulatory systems, and in part because of the
aforementioned interpretation of constitutional law to effectively buffer
companies from their organic food competitors.
B. Extending the ZaudererDoctrine
With InternationalDairy Foods, the Sixth Circuit extended the
constitutional doctrine of free speech one step further when the court
decided to apply the Zaudererdoctrine to advertising that was potentially
misleading, as opposed to inherently or actually misleading.164 The court
misconstrued Supreme Court precedent and produced a substantively
incorrect result. The Sixth Circuit's misapplication is significant in light
of the fact that had there been no extension of Zauderer to cover
potentially misleading advertising, the more stringent CentralHudson test
would have been applied to the Ohio regulation and the regulation may
have been struck down.165
1. Supporting Supreme Court Precedent
The Supreme Court has stated that the Zauderer doctrine applies
only where advertising is inherently or actually misleading.166 First, in In
re R.M.1, the Supreme Court stated that "regulation ... [is] permissible
where the particular advertising is inherently likely to deceive or where
the record indicates that a particular form or method of advertising has in
fact been deceptive" and that "restrictions upon such advertising may be

163 Int'lDairy Foods, 622 F.3d at 634.
I"Id.at 641.
16 Id. at 651 (citing Borgner v. Brooks,
284 F.3d 1204, 1210-13 (11 th Cir. 2002) and
Mason v. Fla. Bar, 208 F.3d 952, 954-55 (11th Cir. 2000)).
1 See supra note 165 and accompanying
text; see also infra notes 167-168 and
accompanying text.

548

Mo. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV., Vol. 18, No. 3
1 67
no broader than reasonably necessary to prevent the deception."
Second, the Zauderer case relied on the In re R.MJ. decision and, in
Zauderer, the regulatory disclosure requirement was supported by
evidence that the advertising in question was both inherently and actually
misleadin.' 16 8 Third, while not joining the majority opinion in
Milavetz,
Justice Thomas's concurrence reaffirmed that Zauderer
should apply to inherently or actual misleading advertising and that "a
bare assertion by the government that a disclosure requirement is
'intended' to prevent consumer deception, standing alone, is not sufficient
to uphold the requirement as applied to all speech that falls within its
sweep."170

2. Sixth Circuit Misapplication
The InternationalDairy Foods court did not find that the organic
food industry's advertisements were either inherently or actually
misleading.' 7 ' According to the plaintiffs' appellate brief:
[T]he State failed to present any evidence of consumer confusion
over the difference between dairy products from cows treated with
rbST and dairy products from cows not treated with rbST ... there
was no evidence before the Court that consumers had been misled
by dairy product labels or that consumers lack the sophistication
necessary to understand their implication. To the contrary,
processors have used labels containing claims such as "rbST Free"
and "No Antibiotics and Pesticides" for over a decade in Ohio

In re R. M. J., 455 U.S. 191, 202-03 (1982).
Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of Supreme Court of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626,

641-42 (1985).
169 Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. United States, 130 S.Ct.
1324 (2010). The Sixth
Circuit relied on this case heavily when they made their decision in InternationalDairy
Foods.Int'l Dairy Foods, 622 F.3d at 640-42.
17 0
Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. U.S., 130 S.Ct. 1324, 1344 (2010) (Thomas, J.,
concurring).
171
1nt'l Dairy Foods, 622 F.3d at 641-43.
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without any meaningful history of consumer confusion or
complaints. 172
Given the dearth of support for the contention that the organic food
industry's advertisements were misleading, the court readily adopted the
position of the plaintiffs and characterized the evidence of consumer
deception concerning both composition and productions claims as
"weak."17 3 Yet, in spite of the Supreme Court's implication that the
Zauderer doctrine applies only to inherently or actually misleading
advertising, the International Dairy Foods court utilized the Zauderer
doctrine against merely "potentially misleading" advertising, contested
only by evidence the court itself characterized as "weak at best." 74
The Supreme Court's articulation of the scope of the Zauderer
doctrine failed to convince the InternationalDairy Foods court. Instead,
to support extension to potentially misleading advertising, the court relied
on the justification of the Zauderer doctrine, that "First Amendment
protection for commercial speech is justified in large part by the
information's value to consumers. The speech rights of advertisers, in
contrast, are of less value; specifically, their 'constitutionally protected
interest in not providing the required factual information is minimal."" 7 5
The court's reasoning is troubling because regardless of the degree or
existence of false or misleading advertising, the value of information to a
consumer and minimal interest of the advertisers in not speaking remains
constant. By the court's same reasoning, this particular justification of the
Zauderer doctrine could be extended to advertising that is not misleading
at all. Indeed, disclosure might be required even in the absence of
advertising as long as there was a rational basis to do so. Applying this
logic, a state might require its milk producers to disclose on their labels
the quality of life of their cattle, because it might arguably be valuable
information to a consumer and consumers may be misled into believing

172 Appellants'

Opening Brief, Int'l Dairy Foods Ass'n v. Boggs, 622 F.3d 628 (6th Cir.
2010) (Nos. 09-3526, 09-3515), 2009 WL 3269471.
" Int'l DairyFoods,622 F.3d at 638, 642.
174 Id. at 638.
' Id. at 641.
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they were consuming milk from cattle with a particularly high quality of
life. However, the Supreme Court's admonitions concerning statemandated "involuntary affirmation" clearly evidences that such a
requirement would be in direct contravention of established constitutional
law.176 It is due to the lack of palatability and inherent conflict with the
current state of the law protecting commercial speech that the Supreme
Court limited the application of the Zaudererdoctrine to inherent or actual
false and misleading advertising.
VI. CONCLUSION

It remains to be seen whether the extension of Zauderer will be
upheld, or instead, whether organic food and conventional food industries
will be treated under the same legal standards. Despite the questionability
of the application of Zauderer in InternationalDairy Foods, there is little
doubt that the organic food industry will continue to grow, regardless of
this case's impact. One can only hope that the legal system will generally
be used to increase the general welfare of the populace, to promote a truly
competitive
economic
marketplace
and
to
conventionalize
environmentalism, regardless of the inconvenience of rectifying legal
inadequacies or the cost to the powerful entrenched industries who know
how to play them. In addition to the unfortunate consequences of
InternationalDairyFoods to the organic food industry, it is important to
note that the threat of continued erosion of the freedom of speech and the
right not to speak may result in the crumbling of the foundational
principles of the Constitution and a plethora of undesirable ramifications
to society at large.
DAVID A. MARTIN

176 See supra notes 49-50 and accompanying text; see also Int'l Dairy Foods Ass'n
v.

Amestoy, 92 F.3d 67, 71 (2d Cir. 1996) ("The right not to speak inheres in political and
commercial speech alike").
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